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Appellant Peter Coats (hereinafter Peter) responds to the Brief of Appellee
Carolyn Gray don (hereinafter Caroline) filed June 24, 2009 in the sequence of her
brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETER'S APPEAL IS TIMELY AND COMPLIES WITH THE
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
A.

Peter's Appeal of the October 2, 2008 Default Order is Timely.

Caroline argues that the appeal by Peter was untimely since his Notice of
Appeal dated November 26, 2008 is more than thirty days after the October 2,
2008 "Minute Entry and Order" of Judge Atherton. Caroline characterizes this
Order as a "Default Judgment" and therefore claims that the Notice of Appeal was
untimely filed. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 19-20). Such an assertion is patently
incorrect.
The Order of Judge Atherton on October 2, 2008 was the entry of a
default—not a judgment. The Court specifically stated:
Therefore, because Respondent has failed to respond to Petitioner's
Motion, this Court's review of the pleadings and for cause appearing
Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default is granted. Respondent's Answer
is stricken, his Default is hereby entered. (R. 2161-163; see Addendum to
this Brief).
It is obvious from reading this "Minute Entry and Order" that it is not a
judgment from which an appeal can be taken. The Order made no attempt to
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disburse property or funds of the parties or to encompass any other matters that
would be included in a valid judgment. The Order simply entered the default of
Peter and struck his Answer thereby allowing a further proceeding to occur in
which a judgment would be taken. "There is an important distinction between a
default and a default judgment." Skanchy v. Calcados Ortopesa, 952 P.2d
1071,1076 (Utah 1998).
Rule 55 relating to defaults provides for a two-pronged procedure: the
entry of a default and the entry of a default judgment. Clearly, had the Court not
entered default on October 2, 2008 any subsequent default judgment would be
improper and voidable. P&B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah App.
1988).
Caroline herself recognized that additional evidence would have to be
presented to Judge Atherton in order for a valid judgment to occur. On October 6,
2008 (R. 2273-2275) Caroline filed the following document: "Petitioner's Motion
for Taking of Petitioner's Testimony in Support of Default Judgment and Entry of
Supplemental Decree." Caroline's pleading stated:
Said motion is based upon the fact that this Court has entered
Respondent's default, and stricken Respondent's pleadings. While a
bifurcated divorce decree has been entered, which granted Petitioner sole
custody of the minor children, no final supplemented decree has been
entered. In order for the court to enter a supplemental decree of divorce,
this Court may wish to hear limited evidence to permit the fair and
equitable settlement of the estate, as prayed for by Petitioner in her
Complaint for Divorce. In support of Petitioner's claims against
Respondent for contempt, award of attorneys' fees, Petitioner submits a
trial brief, herewith, respecting specific relief from this Court.
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Moreover, even in Caroline's own Brief she acknowledges that "Peter's
default" was entered on October 2, 2008. (Appellee's Brief, p.7). She also notes
that at the contempt hearing on October 7, 2008 she was allowed to call witnesses
and introduce exhibits in support of the relief requested in her prior motions and in
her amended trial brief which had been provided to support her position at the
divorce trial. (Appellee's Brief, p. 7). Caroline also noted:
Further, based upon Caroline's testimony and exhibits and the
verified Amended Trial Brief, as well as the totality of the record, and
based upon Peter's default, the Court entered Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce signed
November 10, 2008 and entered November 12, 2008. (Appellee's Brief, p.
7-8).
Caroline has acknowledged throughout these trial and appellate
proceedings that the Judgment in this matter did not occur until November 12,
2008 when the lower court decided the actual division of property and other
matters. Caroline has cited no authority that Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires a party to appeal from the entry of a default prior to the
subsequent entry of the judgment based upon such default. There is simply no
authority to support her position and the appeal in this matter was timely filed well
within the thirty days of the November 12, 2008 judgment.
B.

The April 23, 2009 Order Denying Rule 60(b) Relief Has
No Bearing Upon this Appeal.

Appellee Caroline asserts that because no appeal was taken by Peter from
the April 23,2009 Order of Judge Atherton denying Rule 60(b) relief that
therefore "the issue of Appellant's default is finally resolved and no appeal may be
3

taken at this time, as the time for appeal has passed." (Appellee's Brief, p 21).
This argument is also in error.
After the entry of judgment on November 12,2008, the newly appointed
conservator of Peter elected to file both a direct appeal to this Court and a Rule
60(b) motion to the lower court. As noted in the prior section, the Notice of
Appeal was timely since it was within the thirty-day period allowed by Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The purpose of the present appeal was to
preserve all of the substantive issues that occurred during the seven-year
disposition of this case for review by this Court.
Simultaneously, the conservator elected to file a Rule 60(b) motion
requesting the lower court to provide relief in order that this appeal would not be
necessary. Normally, lower court proceedings and appellate court proceedings
cannot be done simultaneously. However, this Court in Baker v. Western Surety
Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988) accepted a position adopted by a majority of
courts that a trial court has jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) motion while an
appeal is pending. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed this position in White v.
State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990). This Court has recognized the appropriateness
of filing these two simultaneous actions in divorce proceedings. Nigohosian v.
Nigohosian, 204 Utah App. 116 (April 15, 2004). This Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have approved this dual track system in order to allow the lower
court to expeditiously correct errors before the litigants are require to expend time
and resources in a prolonged appeal.
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In this case, for example, the desired effect previously occurred. In January
of 2004 Judge Lewis entered a default against Peter and an amended judgment in
August. In September of 2004 an appeal was taken to this Court in Case No.
20040784. Simultaneously, a Rule 60(b) motion was filed before Judge Lewis
requesting that her prior default judgment be set aside and that the matter be
allowed to proceed on to trial. On March 3, 2005 Judge Lewis granted the Rule
60(b) motion and set aside the prior orders. The parties stipulated to dismissal of
the appeal to this Court and the litigation continued without appellate intervention.
Unfortunately, Judge Atherton did not find merit in Peter's Rule 60(b)
motion and denied it. Although such denial is an appealable order, there is no
reason for Peter to appeal such order because of the narrow appellate review
which applies to such order. As noted by this Court:
Even when an order on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the
appeal is narrow in scope. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only
the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in
most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief
was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in
this matter less Rule 60(b) becomes a substitute for timely appeals. An
inquiry into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the
subject of a direct appeal from the judgment or order. Franklin Covey
Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 460 (Utah App. 2000) (emphasis
added).
In addition, the Franklin Covey case consisted of categorically removed
legal error from the realm of Rule 60(b) review. The Utah Supreme Court
endorsed this reasoning in Fisher v. Bvbee, 104 P.3d 1198 (Utah 2004).
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Thus, the law is clear that an appeal from the Rule 60(b) denial cannot
challenge the underlying judgment itself and that substantive issues regarding the
judgment are beyond the scope of the Rule 60(b) appeal. Moreover, a litigant
must walk a dangerous path in deciding which issues "involve legal errors" and
which issues do not. An incorrect characterization can easily result in a Rule 60(b)
motion being denied.
In Christensen v. Hammon, 205 Ut. App. 19 (Utah App. 01/21/2005) a
default judgment was entered against 1he appellants. The litigants made the fatal
mistake of failing to directly appeal from the judgment itself and instead relied
upon a Rule 60(b) motion. This Court stated:
In their Notice of Appeal, the Hammons identified both the
judgment and the denial of their motion to set aside the judgment as orders
from which the appeal was taken. However, only the appeal from the
denial of the motion to set aside is properly before this Court. The
Hammons did not file a timely notice of appeal from the entry of the
judgment itself. See Utah R. App. T. 4(a) requiring notice of appeal to be
filed within thirty days of the order appealed. Thus, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the judgment.
* * *

On appeal, the Hammons have stated issues that are substantive
challenges to the judgment itself or other underlying orders. These issues
are beyond the scope of review of the trial court's denial of their Rule 60(b)
motion to set aside the judgment. Id. at pp. 19-20.
In summary, all of the issues raised in Appellant's opening Brief are
properly before this Court on this direct appeal, including the propriety of
defaulting Peter, and the failure to appeal the Rule 60(b) denial has no effect on
this appeal.
6

C.

The Notice of Appeal Filed by Peter Complies with Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Properly
Preserves All the Issues Being Raised in This Appeal.

Caroline contends that the Notice of Appeal filed by Peter on November
26, 2008 (incorrectly characterized by Caroline as December 26, 2008) is
defective on its face. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 21-22).
Caroline first argues that the Notice is defective because it does not appeal
from the April 23, 2009 Order of Judge Atherton denying the Rule 60(b) relief
(which occurred some five months after the Notice of Appeal was filed by Peter in
November of 2008). As noted in the prior section, Peter chose to file a direct
appeal from the comprehensive judgment of November 12, 2008 and did so within
the appropriate thirty-day time frame. As also noted in the prior section, he
elected not to file an appeal from the Rule 60(b) order subsequently entered.
Thus, the Rule 60(b) decision has no effect whatsoever upon the timeliness of the
Notice of Appeal filed from the November 12, 2008 Judgment.
Caroline next argues that the Notice is defective because it omits the
Default Order of October 2, 2008 from the listed events.
The Notice of Appeal filed by Peter stated the following:
Notice is hereby given that Respondent and Appellant Peter Coats,
by and through his conservator, Jonathan M. Coats, through counsel, Craig
S. Cook, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Judgment of the
Honorable Judith S. Atherton entered in this matter on November 12, 2008.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment including those
proceedings of August 22, 2002, October 3, 2002, October 7, 2008 and
October 28, 2008. (R. 2375).
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Clearly, Peter appealed from the "Final Judgment" entered on November
12, 2008 as stated in the first paragraph. As additional clarification, the Notice
stated that the appeal was taken from the "entire judgment" including certain
proceedings therein listed. Peter intended to list October 2, 2008 as one of these
proceedings but a typographical error occurred making it October 28_.
In any event, the law is clear that when appealing from an entire final
judgment, it is not necessary to specify each interlocutory order from which the
appellant seeks review. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah
1994). See also, UPC, Inc. v. ROA General Inc. 990 P.2d 945 (Utah App. 1999).
It was not necessary for Peter to list any dates of the interlocutory
proceedings that affected the judgment of November 12, 2008 and therefore the
omission of the correct October 2, 2008 date of the entry of default is irrelevant to
preserving this issue for appeal.
D.

Appellant's Brief is Not Defective and Complies With The
Appellate Rules of Procedure.

Caroline contends that Peter has filed to comply with two briefing
requirements: first, a citation to the record showing an issue was preserved in the
trial court in the Statement of Issues; second, no citation to the record in the
Statement of Facts. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 22-25). Again, Appellee is mistaken.
Appellant has raised four issues in this appeal: (1) whether the lower court
improperly voided a settlement reached by the parties themselves; (2) whether the
lower court erred in defaulting Peter; (3) whether the lower court erred in
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awarding damages against the clear weight of the evidence; and (4) whether the
lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees when there was no evidence that such
fees were needed and reasonable.
All of these issues are properly preserved in this appeal by the various trial
court orders relating to them. No action was required by Peter in order to preserve
these issues for appeal..
This is not a case, for example, where jury instructions or trial evidence is
being contested and where timely objections have to be made. Here, for example,
the entry of the Default Judgment including various findings of damages require
no additional "preservation" on the part of Peter in order to appeal these awards.
Thus, the issues in this case do not lend themselves to the citation rule contained in
Rule 24(5)(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellant in his Brief chose to use his "Statement of Facts" to describe the
course of litigation which occurred in this seven-year odyssey. (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 2-8). All of the matters contained therein are undisputed judicial events which
narrate the history of this litigation. They are no different than the history given
by Caroline in her "Statement of the Case" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-8) which also
lists the various judicial events which occurred. It should be noted that both
statements of judicial history of Appellant and Appellee contain no record
references since they are not needed in the undisputed history of this litigation.
Perhaps, Peter should have chosen to use the heading "Statement of the
Case" instead of "Statement of Facts" to narrate this judicial history. In any
9

event, the true "Statement of Facts" involving items of dispute iis found in each of
the legal points raised in Appellant's Brief. (See Statement of Applicable Facts,
pp. 10-15;. 22-28;. 33-34; 35-41; 42-43; and 44-46, Appellant's Brief). These
"facts" are well documented with citations to the record, hearing transcripts, and to
reproduction of documents contained in Appellant's Appendix.
Appellee Caroline has chosen to place the facts relating to all issues raised
by Peter in one portion of the Brief (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-19) as opposed to
Peter's choice to place the applicable statement of facts with each issue of law as
noted supra. Peter believes that this division allows the facts to be more focused
as to each legal issue rather than to be lost in a long dissertation of facts relating to
many issues.
Certainly, none of the cases cited by Caroline prohibit a party from
focusing facts as to each issue as long as the basic citation and relevancy
requirements are met. Peter has complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure
in the preparation of his brief.
D.[sic] Peter's Appeal of the Order of October 3, 2002 is Timely.
Caroline contends that present Rules of Civil Procedure; and former Rules
of Judicial Administration 6-401(4) preclude Peter from raising the validity of
Judge Lewis' Order striking down the Settlement Agreement reached by the
parties. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 25-26). Caroline argues that because Peter's
attorney did not object to the Commissioner recommendation as provided in these
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rules that he is unable to appeal from the order entered by the trial court pursuant
to such recommendation.
Caroline has cited no authority for this proposition. There is nothing in the
rules which state that the order of the court is not subject to appellate review as is
any interlocutory order throughout a litigated proceeding. Had the hearing been
held before Judge Lewis initially and the order striking the Settlement Agreement
entered, there is no doubt that such order would be appealable. The mere fact that
the Commissioner initially held the hearing and Judge Lewis entered the Findings
without objection does not change the validity of her Order or make it any less
final for purposes of appeal.
While it is clear that failure to object to the Commissioner's Order
precludes any further argument to the trial court about the merits of the prior
order, there is nothing in the past or present rules that make the trial court the final
appellate authority as, for example, when an appeal is taken from a Justice Court
to a District Court.
Caroline states, "The recommendation then became the Order of the Court.
The Order of October 3, 2002 became and remained the law of the case at the date
of Peter's default." (Appellee's Brief, p. 26). This is correct and as such is a valid
interlocutory order that can now be appealed after the final judgment was entered.
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POINT II
THE APRIL 16, 2002 AGREEMENT WAS A
LEGALLY VALID CONTRACT OF
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN EFFECT
IN 2002 THEREBY AFFECTING ALL
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION.
Caroline's version of the facts relating to the April 16, 2002 Agreement is
contained in her "Statement of Facts" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-13). Peter believes
that several of these statements are incorrect. For example, Caroline contends that
Peter's counsel at the time of the hearing acknowledged that there were several
necessary terms missing from the Settlement Agreement. (Appellee's Brief, p.
11). Peter does not believe the reference citation supports this contention nor can
he find anything in the hearing transcript to support it.
While Caroline argues that Peter virtually did nothing during the seven
years to assert the validity of the April 2002 agreement (Appellee's Brief, p. 11)
this statement is contrary to the statement made by Caroline's counsel during the
October 7, 2008 evidentiary hearing. Ms. Williams stated to the Court:
Part of the problem that has arisen in this case time and time again is
that Mr. Coats is fixated on the belief'that there is some prenuptial—or
postnuptial agreement or agreement that's been reached by the parties.
This has been resolved back in 2002, and he keeps bringing it up. It is the
law of the case. He won 'tgive up. We need Your Honor's assistance in
making him understand that there are no agreements. That's why we had a
three-day trial schedule because there were no stipulations, postnuptial
agreements or anything else that was enforceable. (Tr. Oct. 7, 2008, p.
11 l)(emphasis added).
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The colloquy between the Court and Peter concerning his assertion
concerning the Constitution of the United States and Utah (citation should be page
116 and 117) has no relevance in this appeal except to make Peter look badly. In
essence, Peter as a.pro se litigant was attempting to assert the Settlement
Agreement and, or course, could not do so against skilled counsel retained by
Caroline.
In any event, Caroline's silence in her brief has again acknowledged that
she has never paid to Peter the $9,920 ordered by the Commissioner and Court.
Instead, she states that "the payment by Caroline to Peter of $9,920 was not a
stated condition precedent in the October 3, 2002 Order to the lower court findings
that all prior agreements between the parties was void and without legal effect."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 13).
To the contrary, the Commissioner noted on several instances that Peter had
"detrimentally relied" upon his belief that a Settlement Agreement had been
reached and, as quoted in Peter's prior Brief, ordered the return of the funds
immediately and stated, "You can't have it both ways and so you give him back
the money immediately." (Appellant's Brief, p. 21).
In the Argument portion of her Brief, (Appellee's Brief, pp. 26-29) several
statements are also erroneous. For example, Caroline states, "In the instant case,
the alleged Settlement Agreement was never reduced to writing, a point upon
which both parties fully agree." (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). Again, to the contrary,
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the "Decree of Divorce" prepared by Caroline was definitely in writing as
evidenced on pages 48 and 49 of Appellant's opening Appendix.
She further states, "It as not signed by counsel for either party."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 27). Peter at that point had no counsel since he had
dismissed her in reliance upon the Agreement being presented to Judge Lewis by
Caroline's attorney.
The reliance by the Commissioner, the trial court, and Caroline upon then
existing UCJA 4-504 completely distorts the impact of the Settlement Agreement.
Had Caroline chosen to prepare a settlement agreement similar in form to the one
she prepared on June 16, 1998 (see Appellant's Opening Appendix, pp. 44-45) the
question as to compliance with Rule 4-504 would never have come up. In
essence, instead of looking upon the agreement between Caroline and Peter as a
valid Settlement Agreement with consideration, the Commissioner and the Court
viewed it as a final Order subject to the rules necessary for valid entry. It is the
substance of the Agreement—not the form, which should have controlled.
Had a Settlement Agreement been prepared as had been done in the past by
Caroline, it would have been up to her attorney to properly prepare an order in the
correct format of UCJA 4-504. However, this order would only be a reflection of
the prior valid Settlement Agreement reached by the parties. Thus, the
Commissioner and the court erred by failing to look at the actual contractual
Agreement reached by the parties and instead upon the form chosen by Caroline in
which to implement the Agreement.
14

Caroline attempts to distinguish the Goodmansen case (Appellee's Brief,
pp. 27-28) on the basis that counsel for the parties were involved in reaching an
agreement rather than the parties themselves. Certainly, there is nothing in that
case that states that litigants are precluded from making their own agreements
without their attorneys in order to have a valid settlement. Also, Caroline states,
"Ther was no meeting of the minds resulting in a full settlement agreement."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 28). Again, the parties agreed to all of the elements they
thought were relevant to a settlement agreement and put it in writing. Certainly,
their intent as to those items should have been given great deference by the trial
court in making any divorce decision.
The remainder of Caroline's arguments contained in the legal portion of the
brief have previously been addressed. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 28-29). For this
reason, therefore, Peter respectfully asks that this Court remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of the Settlement Agreement and the
effect it should be given.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEFAULTING
APPELLANT PETER WHEN THE RECORD SHOWS
HE WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH TO COMPLY
WITH DISCOVERY.
Caroline misunderstands the scope of Peter's appeal concerning the entry of
the default judgment before this Court. Peter is not relying upon Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in asking that this Court set aside the Default
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Judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 32-33). All the cases cited by Caroline involve appeals
from orders of trial courts denying Rule 60(b) relief. Thus, all of these cases are
irrelevant to this appeal.
In Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995) a
default judgment was entered in a condemnation case. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court considered two distinct contentions: first, whether the lower court
erred in striking the answer and entering the default of the appellant pursuant to
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to failure to provide discovery;
and second, whether the lower court eiTed in failing to grant a Rule 60(b) motion
to set aside the default. While the standards of discretion are similar there are
nevertheless distinct differences in the former over the latter.
Before a court can grant a default for discovery failure there must be a
showing of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault on the part of the non-complying
party." First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1984).
In the Osguthorpe case, the court noted that Osguthorpe was in contact with
legal counsel throughout and at the end of the process and completely failed to
make any effort either pro se or with an attorney. The court noted, "This is not a
case where a confused and unassisted layman was thrown out of the courthouse
simply for missing a discovery deadline." 892 P.2d at 11.
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It would serve no useful purpose to reargue the factual evidence in this case
relating to the efforts of Peter as to the discovery requests. There is no question
that neither he nor his attorneys formally filed the correct discovery certificates in
the record to indicate discovery compliance. However, the trial court in entering
the default did not consider Peter's good faith belief that he had in fact produced
the documents requested in most of the discovery demands. As noted in
Appellant's opening Brief (p. 32) the Court seemed unaware of the September 5,
2008 document filed by Peter specifically stating that he had answered all the
previous interrogatories and requests as well as the conversation he had had with
Caroline's attorney to the same effect.
It was not until the hearing of October 7, 2008, which occurred after the
entry of the default, that Peter was allowed to testify to his belief that he had
supplied many of the discovery requests. As he noted, "If we're given a 15-minute
break I will find it in the court records." (Tr. Oct. 7, 2008, p. 153-54).
There is certainly no doubt that the lower court has broad discretion under
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in ordering a default and a default
judgment for failure to comply with discovery. However, the specific standard of
"willfulness, bad faith, or fault" must be found before such an extreme remedy can
be imposed, It is respectfully requested that this matter be remanded to the lower
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine what discovery requests were
satisfied in spite of the lack of formal certification in the record. Certainly,
competent trial counsel for Peter can quickly present any evidence in his defense
17

that would negate against a default being entered or will be unable to present such
evidence thereby supporting the default entry.

POINT IV
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT
RELATING TO DAMAGES FROM THE SALE OF THE
"NORTH PARCEL" ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
Caroline relies upon the case of Skanchy v. Calcados Ortopesa, 952 P.2d
1071 (Utah 1998) in support of her claim that there is sufficient evidence to justify
an award of over $500,000 to her. (Appellee's Brief p.35). In this case the Utah
Supreme Court stated the following:
To enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must
review the complaint; determine whether the allegations state a valid claim
for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by some valid
evidence. In other words, the allegations in the complaint are not a
sufficient basis for awarding unliquidated damages. See Larsen v. Colinna,
684 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984). That usually means a hearing must be held so
that the plaintiff can provide evidentiary support for the award of damages.
Id. at 1076.
Caroline's claim that Peter allegedly did not respond to various discovery
requests or was otherwise not helpful in the divorce does not equate into sufficient
evidence to show that he prevented the sale of the north property which resulted in
a loss of over $500,000 to Caroline. (Appellee's Brief p. 35).
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As noted by Caroline, the evidence before the Court was that there was an
offer to buy the property for $5,200,000, the amount of actual proceeds from the
foreclosure of the property was less than this and that the attorney affidavit of
Bryce Panzer stated that, "Although there were at least two viable offers on the
north parcel, Peter Coats would not proceed to close either of them because he
would not agree to Caroline Gray don's condition that the proceeds of the sale of
the property be escrowed pending a resolution by the divorce court as to the
interest of the parties." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 36-37).
Thus, Caroline has offered no additional evidence other than the Panzer
affidavit from that which was proffered by Peter in his opening Brief (pp. 33-34;
35-41).
The affidavit of Mr. Panzer was not offered during the October 7 hearing in
support of damages for the failed sale. Instead, it was offered in an attempt to
have the lower court award attorneys' fees of some $105,000 to Caroline for
lawsuits not involving the actual divorce. The lower court declined to pay these
fees to Mr. Panzer but "reserved" the issue. (Finding No. 24, R. 2337; Appellant's
opening Appendix, pp. 15-16).
The statement contained in paragraph (e) of Mr. Panzer's affidavit (see p. 4
of Appellee's Addendum) is insufficient as a matter of law to support the claim
that Peter intentionally prevented the sale of the property to Mr. Hagen. The
statement by Mr. Panzer does not identify this particular sale and in fact states
there were "at least two very viable offers" which may not even include the Hagen
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proposal. This vague opinion statement contained in an attorney affidavit is
certainly insufficient evidence to support the claim that Peter intentionally
prevented a sale which would have brought him personally an additional
$500,000.
There is simply no competent evidence in the record either in the form of
testimony or documents to support this award.
Contrary to Caroline's assertion, it is not required in a default proceeding
that the defaulting party rebut the evidence of the prevailing party. (Appellee's
Brief, p. 37). In most instances, the defaulting party is not even present. The law
is clear that the prevailing party themselves must produce sufficient evidence to
justify a default judgment award. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950
(UtahApp. 1989).
Therefore, the award of over $500,000 to Caroline should be reversed as a
matter of law.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT PETER
IN THE AMOUNT OF $240,220 FOR APPELLEE
CAROLINE'S ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH FEES ARE
BASED ON NEED AND REASONABLENESS.
Caroline focuses her response, as to the appropriateness; of over $240,000
of attorneys fees, to the issue of "reasonableness." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-40).
She has presented no additional evidence from that marshaled by Appellant in his
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opening Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-48). Certainly, Peter has no dispute
with the legal standards enunciated in determining whether a lawyer's fee is
reasonable under the circumstances. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 39-40). Peter would
welcome an opportunity to conduct an evidentiary hearing of the various lawyers
and their fees in accordance with these principles and standards.
However, and more importantly, Appellee has failed to present any
additional evidence in support of her need for attorneys' fees. Caroline makes
no mention in her brief of any evidence relating to her financial situation requiring
that these large fees be paid.
The lower court did not enter any specific finding as to Caroline's need.
(See Appellant's opening Brief, pp. 42-43). Apparently, Caroline is unable to cite
any evidence in the record to justify this need. This is not surprising since she
received over $900,000 from the sale of the north parcel together with a marital
home worth over $400,000.
Because Utah law requires that an award must be based on the evidence of
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the failure to meet this essential element
is fatal to the $240,000 award.
This award should be vacated or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing
should be held regarding the reasonableness of the fees and the need of Caroline.
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POINT VI
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE
AWARDED TO THE PREVAILING PARTY.
Peter acknowledges that the prevailing party in a divorce appeal may
receive attorneys' fees if the legal criteria are met. Of course, Peter would request
that such an award be considered in his. favor should he be the prevailing party
based on the totality of the appeal.
CONCLUSION
The procedural arguments raised by Caroline concerning this appeal are
without merit. The four issues validly raised by Peter have been adequately
briefed by both parties and are now ready for decision.
Peter respectfully requests that he be granted appropriate relief as to each of
these four issues.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2009.

Craig S. CMok
Attorney for Respondent-Appellant
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ADDENDUM

FILED D i S i m u . , a U h i
Third Judicial District

OCT 0 2 2008
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT g

^W
Deputy Cler1--

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Caroline Coats,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs.

:
Peter Coats,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

CASE NO. 014902286

:

Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default, filed
September 15, 2008 and properly served on the Respondent. This matter came before the
Court, the Honorable Michelle Blomquist, for hearing on August 28, 2008. At that time the
Commissioner recommended the granting of Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery
responses, the Commissioner having found that Respondent previously had not responded
to any discovery request. The Commissioner ordered that all previously propounded
interrogatories and requests for production of documents be answered by September 5,
2008 at 5:00 p.m. The Commissioner's recommendation is an order of this Court until
vacated by a Judge. This Court signed the Order September 26, 2008.
Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to comply with the Order on the Motion to
Compel. Respondent has failed to respond to Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default, and
this Court has no other pleadings or other response confirming the submission of discovery
to Petitioner.
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Therefore, because Respondent has failed to respond to Petitioner's Motion , this
Court's review of the pleadings and for good cause appearing, Petitioner's Motion for
Entry of Default is granted. Respondent's answer is stricken, his default is hereby entered.
Based on the Court's ruling and the entry of Respondent's default, the trial is
stricken. The Court will address the certified contempt issues on Tuesday, October 7, 2008
at 9:00 a.m.

Dated this *-" day of %d

- . 2008.
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